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Can the Supply of Small  
Business Loans be Increased?
By Jim Wilkinson and Jon Christensson
S
mall and new businesses, widely credited as engines for job growth, 
have struggled during the recovery. One reason, say some analysts, 
is that bank lending to small businesses has declined steadily since 
the start of the recession. If, as many small businesses claim, the supply 
of credit from banks has contracted, then increasing the supply of small 
business loans may allow these businesses to grow and create new jobs. 
Understanding the factors that affect loan supply may help policymak-
ers design policies to increase the supply of small business loans and, 
therefore, support further job growth. 
This article analyzes the potential effectiveness of two strategies 
that policymakers can use to expand the supply of small business loans: 
increasing bank capital and reducing problem assets. A review of recent 
policy initiatives suggests that influencing bank capital may be easier 
than addressing problem assets. However, reducing problem assets may 
lead to a larger and more persistent increase in the supply of loans. 
Section I examines the connection between job growth and small 
business lending. Section II reviews supply and demand factors that 
affect lending decisions at banks. It focuses on two supply factors— 
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capital and problem assets—and provides examples of policies that 
have attempted to influence these factors during the crisis. Section III 
describes the statistical analysis and data used to measure the impor-
tance of the policy variables while controlling for the influence of de-
mand and other market factors. Section IV presents the results of the 
analysis and the likely effect that changes in capital and problem assets 
may have on small business lending. 
I.   JOB GROWTH AND SMALL BUSINESS LENDING
The U.S. economy lost 9 million jobs in the recent recession and 
initial months of the recovery. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates 
that total employment fell from a peak of 138 million in January 2008 
to a low of 129 million as of February 2010.1 Further, job growth over 
the next few years is expected to be anemic. The consensus Blue Chip 
forecast (July 2011) anticipates that the unemployment rate will fall to 
only 8.1 percent in 2012.
Many policymakers are looking to new and small businesses to gen-
erate jobs. Small businesses employ roughly 50 percent of all Americans 
(Bernanke, 2010). Small businesses are also widely perceived as engines 
for job growth. According to Karen Mills, administrator of the U.S. 
Small Business Administration, “Small businesses create 2 of every 3 new 
jobs each year.” Recent research also suggests that new firms are respon-
sible for job growth.2 Of course, these new firms start as small firms.
Small businesses have struggled to retain their workers during this re-
covery. From 2008:Q1 through 2010:Q1, employment in establishments 
with less than 100 employees fell by 3.9 million or 6 percent. By another 
measure, establishments employing up to nine employees accounted for 
22 percent of all job losses nationally from 2008:Q1 to 2009:Q2.3 
One reason for the losses may be that small businesses are more 
dependent on bank credit than large businesses, and lending to small 
businesses has declined.4 Although there is surprisingly little direct data 
on bank lending to small businesses, data are available for loans to all 
businesses and for small loans to all businesses (not necessarily loans to 
small businesses). These data show that lending to all U.S. businesses 
declined 22 percent from September 2008 to June 2010 and that small 
loans to businesses fell 8 percent over the same period.5 ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  37
II.   SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR SMALL  
BUSINESS LENDING
Given the slow pace of the recovery and rising levels of problem 
loans, many banks have become more risk averse. Many have tightened 
their lending standards and moved away from loans and into securities. 
Falling capital levels, due in large part to losses on problem loans, have 
reduced the lending capacity of many banks.6 As a result, small busi-
nesses have found it difficult to secure loans.
At the same time, many bankers have reported weak demand from 
qualified small business borrowers. Businesses with weak sales or poor 
prospects are more likely to cut back rather than expand their business, 
thereby reducing demand for credit. A recent survey of small businesses 
by the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) showed 
that “weak sales” is the biggest concern for 27 percent of respondents, 
while only 3 percent of respondents report financing as the biggest 
problem (NFIB, 2011).
Factors affecting supply of small business lending
In the recent recession, policymakers implemented several policies to 
increase the supply of small business lending. Two of the strategies em-
ployed were raising bank capital and reducing problem assets in banks. 
Bank capital is a source of funding for new loans. But more impor-
tantly, banks hold capital to absorb unexpected losses. Following pru-
dent business practices and regulatory requirements, banks hold capital 
in proportion to their assets. If a bank’s ratio of capital to assets falls to 
or below regulatory minimums, the bank must raise additional capital 
or reduce its assets. Growth in capital should be positively correlated 
with lending since it provides banks funds and the capacity to make 
additional small business loans. Banks typically leverage new capital by 
increasing deposits. Thus, when banks raise new capital, new lending 
should increase by more than the increase in capital.
In the last few years, two programs have directly targeted the level 
of capital at banks. The first program was the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP), created at the height of the financial crisis in Octo-
ber 2008 and originally designed to purchase “toxic assets” from banks. 
Its focus was quickly changed to provide new capital in the form of   
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purpose of the TARP’s Capital Purchase Program (CPP) was “to stabi-
lize the financial system by providing capital to viable financial institu-
tions of all sizes throughout the nation. With a strengthened capital 
base, financial institutions have an increased capacity to lend to U.S. 
businesses and consumers and to support the U.S. economy.”7 
The second program was the Small Business Jobs Act, passed by 
Congress in September 2010. The Act includes a new Small Business 
Lending Fund (SBLF), which provides up to $30 billion in new capital 
to community banks to support small business lending. 
Problem assets, which include past-due and nonaccrual loans and 
foreclosed properties, may reduce bank lending in two ways.8 First, 
problem loans and foreclosed property require substantial management 
time and attention, and they generate additional monitoring, collec-
tion, and legal costs. This makes banks more risk averse, leading to 
tighter lending standards and reducing the supply of new loans.
Second, problem assets reduce bank earnings and slow capital   
accumulation. Because problem loans are non-earning assets, they re-
duce net interest income. Income is reduced further when banks make 
provisions for expected loan losses. Loan loss provisions are expense 
payments that go into the bank’s allowance for loan losses. When loans 
are charged off, the bank writes down its loan balances and the loan 
loss allowance by the amount of the charged-off loan. Although the 
charge–off recognizes the loan loss, the actual loss or reduction in in-
come occurs when the loan loss provision is made. The reduction in net 
interest income and the increase in provision expense reduces income 
and lowers the bank’s retained earnings, an important part of the bank’s 
capital. As discussed above, reducing a bank’s capital lowers its capacity 
to make new loans.
Several programs have tried to remove problem assets from bank 
balance sheets, but their success has been limited. In March 2009, the 
Treasury turned its attention back to the TARP’s original purpose of 
buying problem assets. The Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) jointly announced the 
Legacy Asset Program. This program consisted of two parts: the Legacy 
Securities Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) and the Legacy 
Loan Program. The purpose of the PPIP was to increase liquidity in 
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problem securities, free up capital, and increase lending. The Legacy 
Loan Program was similar in nature.9 The FDIC would provide funding 
and debt guarantees for investment funds formed by outside investors. 
These investment funds would purchase problem assets from banks. 
As a program to remove problem assets, the Legacy Loan Program 
was ineffective. Banks did not offer problem assets for sale under the 
program, in part, because they would have had to realize losses on the 
assets if the sale occurred. Furthermore, valuations on sold assets (espe-
cially securities) could serve as benchmarks for writing down other simi-
lar assets retained by the banks. Because banks did not participate, no 
problem assets were removed from bank balance sheets. The program is 
no longer in use.
Supporting evidence
Changes in both bank capital and problem assets appeared to play a 
role in the decline in bank lending during the recent recession. This rela-
tionship can be seen in Chart 1, which shows the levels of business loans, 
bank capital, problem assets, and loan loss provision for all U.S. com-
munity banks from the start of the recession at year-end 2007 through 
2010. During the recession and unfolding financial crisis, business lend-
ing by community banks declined 15.6 percent. Capital in community 
banks declined, while problem loans and loan loss provisions increased 
substantially. Over the period, there appeared to be a clear correlation 
between these supply factors and small business lending. 
III.  STATISTICAL MODEL AND DATA
Regression analysis is used to estimate the effect of changes in bank 
capital, problem assets, and other variables on small business lending. 
The regression equation includes supply variables, demand variables, 
and other control variables. The selection of variables to include in the 
regression equation is based on a simple model of supply and demand 
for small business loans. 
 The supply variables are factors that affect a bank’s production 
function. These include capital, core deposits, asset quality of the cur-
rent loan portfolio (problem assets and loan loss provisions), and mea-
sures of liquid assets and lending strategies. 40  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The demand for loans by small businesses is a “derived demand,” 
that is, businesses need bank credit as an input for producing their final 
goods and services. Rather than assessing demand for individual goods 
and services, broader business conditions in each market and the gen-
eral business outlook are examined. Both local and national business 
conditions may be important and are measured by local employment 
and national real gross domestic product (GDP), respectively.10 Also 
the outlook for future business is important and is measured using re-
sponses from surveys of small business owners. 
Control variables account for differences in local markets that are 
related to the type of market (rural vs. urban) and the degree of local 
competition. Additional information about the supply and demand 
model, the regression variables, and how they are measured is provided 
in the Appendix.
The analysis focuses on community banks in the Tenth Federal 
Reserve District and the conditions in their local markets over time.11 
Community banks are generally smaller banks that rely heavily on re-
lationships with individuals and businesses in their local geographical 
market. For example, in the Tenth District, on average, 80 percent of a 
community bank’s deposits are in branches located in the market where 
the bank is headquartered.12 
Chart 1
COMMUNITY BANK BUSINESS LENDING, CAPITAL, 
PROBLEM ASSET, AND LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS, 2007-10
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In this analysis, community banks are defined as having less than 
$1 billion in total assets. Virtually all business loans by banks of this 
size are made to small borrowers. Community banks cannot effectively 
meet the borrowing and other financial needs of large businesses. Reg-
ulatory limits on loan size and the need to maintain a diversified loan 
portfolio keep community bank loans at a size appropriate for small 
businesses.13 In contrast, determining the proportion of small business 
loans at larger banks is difficult. Though large banks report the amount 
of their small balance loans, they do not identify the proportions of 
small balance loans made to small versus large business customers.
Community banks have wide coverage across the Tenth District. 
They make up 96 percent of all district banks and operate in almost 
every county and metropolitan area in the district.14 Because commu-
nity banks conduct most of their activities in local markets, which are 
defined in this article as metropolitan areas or as counties in rural areas, 
it is relatively easy to identify the local business conditions that affect 
their lending.15 
Focusing on community banks has some limitations. One limi-
tation results from excluding large banks, which account for a large   
percentage of small business loans.16 Larger banks may use different 
lending technologies, such as greater reliance on FICO credit scores 
as opposed to personal information to make lending decisions. As a 
result, the analysis may not apply to a major source of small busi-
ness lending. Another limitation is some loans used for small business 
purposes are not classified as small business loans. For example, many 
small business owners use personal credit cards or home equity lines 
of credit to help fund their businesses.17 These loans would not be 
included in this study.
Data on Tenth District community banks and their local market 
conditions are available on a quarterly basis over an extended peri-
od. The analysis uses data from the first quarter of 2001 through the 
fourth quarter of 2009. This period includes the recessions of 2001 
and 2008-2009 and includes small business lending through more 
than a full business cycle. Data for the banks’ small business loans and 
other bank characteristics are obtained from the Reports of Condition 
and Income (call reports) that banks file with regulators each quarter. 42  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The call reports contain detailed financial information about a bank’s 
income statement and balance sheet.
In the regression, new business loans are measured using the   
quarterly growth rate (percentage change) in business (commercial and 
industrial) loans as the dependent variable.18 Bank capital is measured 
as the quarterly growth rate of Tier 1 capital. Tier 1 capital is a regula-
tory capital measure that includes equity and retained earnings while 
excluding most intangible assets. Problem assets are measured as a per-
centage of total loans. The regressions include four lags of the depen-
dent variable and of most of the explanatory variables. Information on 
how all variables are measured is in the Appendix.
IV.   REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The results of the analysis show that business lending is affected 
by the supply variables but not the demand variables. In particular, the 
two variables associated with recent government programs to increase 
small business lending—capital and problem loans—are statistically 
significant.19 Thus, both of these variables are potentially useful policy 
targets for increasing small business lending.
As expected, an increase in bank capital was associated with higher 
lending (Table 1). The long-run effect of a one-percentage-point in-
crease in a bank’s capital growth is estimated to increase its lending 
growth rate by 0.11 percentage points, other things equal.20 The prob-
lem-assets variable showed a negative relationship with small business 
lending. That is, a one-percentage-point increase in a bank’s ratio of 
problem loans to total loans is estimated to decrease lending growth by 
0.39 percentage point in the long run. 
Although these results are statistically significant, the economic ef-
fect on lending not only depends on the coefficient size, but also on the 
change in the policy variable. Comparing the effects of changes in the 
capital and problem-asset variables on bank lending requires looking 
at equal changes in the two policy variables, which depends on how 
“equal” is defined. 
One sense of an equal change is the standard deviation of the 
variables because it represents historical variations in the data that are 
equally likely to occur. The standard deviation of capital growth is 3.7 
percent. Based on Tier 1 capital in district community banks at year–ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  43
end 2010, a one standard-deviation increase is $502 million in Tier 
1 capital. The regression results indicate that a one-time increase of 
capital by $502 million is estimated to raise small business lending over 
four quarters by only $59 million, an increase of 0.5 percent over the 
year-end 2010 level.21 A one-standard-deviation reduction in the prob-
lem asset ratio (2 percent) implies a drop in problem assets of $1.8 
billion or almost 46 percent of the problem loans at the end of 2010.22 
This is estimated to increase small business lending by $111 million 
four quarters after the decrease in problem assets. 
An alternative to a one-standard-deviation change is to use equal 
dollar changes in the policy variables. Such a comparison is useful for 
evaluating the effectiveness of the policy options for a given cost to the 
government. Four quarters after increasing capital by $100, small busi-
ness lending is estimated to increase by $12. Similarly, four quarters 
after reducing problem assets by $100, small business lending is esti-
mated to increase by $6. Although the effect of a reduction in problem 
assets is smaller in the first year, it is more persistent in later years. In 
the long run, both a $100 increase in capital and a $100 reduction in 
problem assets would increase small business lending by about $13. 
The small estimated sizes of the policy effects makes these lending 
supply policy variables an inefficient option for increasing small busi-
ness lending. For example, it would be more effective for policymak-
ers to give money directly to small businesses in the form of grants or 
loans rather than putting funds into banks’ capital accounts. Of course, 
giving money directly to businesses raises many other potential issues, 
such as the potential for favoritism, fraud, and abuse and the difficulty 
in choosing winners and losers.
Table 1
SUPPLY FACTOR’S LONG-RUN IMPACT ON LENDING
 Variable Name Long-run Effect on Lending (percent)
Tier 1 capital growth 0.11
Deposit and other borrowings growth 0.15
Problem assets to total loans -0.39
Loan loss provisions to total loans -5.87
Note: The table shows the estimated long-run percentage change in lending due to a 1-percentage- 
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These results, however, may underestimate the effects that in-
creased capital could have on small business lending. The regression 
is based only on business lending, which accounts for just 14 percent 
of community bank lending. If policies are designed specifically to en-
courage small business lending relative to other types of lending, the 
proportion of new small business loans could be much more than 14 
percent of new lending. For example, the dividend rate banks pay to 
the U.S. Treasury on capital from the SBLF declines as banks increase 
small business lending. Thus, if banks that obtain capital from the 
SBLF use the capital to make only business loans, each dollar of new 
capital could result in a much greater impact on new business loans.
The regression also assumes that other variables remain unchanged. 
Policy changes, however, may cause feedback effects on other variables 
that impact small business lending. For example, banks that receive 
new capital may leverage the capital by raising new deposits. Banks that 
reduce problem assets also may be able to reduce loan loss provisions. 
Both of these changes should increase small business lending. The re-
gression coefficients indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
the level of core deposits ($6.3 billion) would increase small business 
lending by $104 million after four quarters, while a one standard-devi-
ation decline in the level of loan loss provisions ($205 million) would 
increase small business lending by $198 million in four quarters.
Thus, to take account of these feedback effects, it is necessary to 
estimate a more general model that allows more interaction among the 
variables. One such approach is a vector autoregression (VAR). A VAR 
is a set of regressions, one for small business lending and one for each of 
the other variables that may have feedback effects.23 The regressions use 
the same data for Tenth District community banks and their markets. 
The VAR results can be used to calculate the response of small business 
lending to a one-time change in capital or problem assets, accounting 
for feedback interactions.24 
Chart 2 shows the change in small business lending in each quarter 
(for nine quarters) after capital growth increases and the problem asset 
ratio decreases by one-standard-deviation. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in capital of $502 million is estimated to cause lending to 
rise initially, but the effect is short lived. Four quarters after the shock, 
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estimated cumulative increase is $72 million. Even though the VAR al-
lows for variable interactions, these results are comparable to the results 
found in the regression analysis above, suggesting that there is little 
feedback effect among capital and other endogenous variables. In par-
ticular, the results show that banks did not use additional borrowings 
to leverage their capital and increase small business loans.
The reduction in problem assets has a larger and more prolonged ef-
fect on small business lending when feedback effects are considered. Four 
quarters after the shock, a one standard-deviation reduction in problem 
assets is estimated to increase small business lending by a cumulative $515 
million, which is almost five times larger than in the regression analysis. 
Allowing for feedback also indicates that a given dollar decrease 
in problem assets increases small business lending much more than an 
equal increase in capital. In the VAR estimation, four quarters after 
a $100 increase in capital, small business lending increases by $14, 
whereas a $100 reduction in problem assets leads to an increase of $29. 
Thus, for the same cost to the government, reducing problem assets 
is estimated to be twice as effective as increasing capital in increasing 
small business lending.25 
Chart 2
RESPONSE OF SMALL BUSINESS LENDING TO  
CHANGES IN CAPITAL AND PROBLEM ASSETS
Note: The chart shows the responses of lending each quarter after a one-time, one-standard- 
[Deviation change in capital ($502 million) and problem assets (-$1.8 billion).46  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
VI.   CONCLUSIONS
Policymakers have looked to new and small businesses to create new 
jobs as the U.S. economy slowly recovers from the 2008-09 recession. 
However, small businesses have struggled. One reason may be a decline 
in bank lending to small businesses. This article examined two policy 
tools to increase the supply of small business lending: increasing bank 
capital and reducing problem assets.
The results show that both strategies have a statistically significant 
effect on the supply of small business loans and thus are potentially use-
ful policy tools for expanding the supply of small business loans. How-
ever, the economic effect of the two policies is different. Policies that 
provide additional capital to community banks are likely to generate 
only a small amount of new business lending. Although banks would 
be expected to leverage new capital and thereby generate new lending 
greater than the amount of new capital, both single-equation and VAR 
techniques show new business lending increases by only a fraction of 
the additional capital. Although it is possible that these results underes-
timate the policy impact, small business lending is unlikely to increase 
by the amount of capital provided to banks.
The statistical results indicate that policies that can reduce the 
amount of problem loans are likely to lead to a larger increase in small 
business lending than would an equal increase in capital, although the in-
crease in lending is still much smaller than the decrease in problem assets. 
The effect was more pronounced in the VAR analysis, which incorpo-
rated feedback effects among the variables. Unfortunately, recent policies 
designed to remove problem assets from bank balance sheets have been 
difficult to implement. For example, the FDIC’s Legacy Loan Program 
did not attract any problem assets from banks and was discontinued. 
Therefore, policymakers face a choice between ineffective capital policies 
that are easy to implement and potentially more effective problem–asset 
policies that are difficult to implement successfully.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  47
APPENDIX
The Appendix provides additional information about the statistical 
analysis used in the article. It includes a simple model of supply and de-
mand for small business loans that helps guide the selection of variables 
used in the analysis. The Appendix also describes how the theoretical vari-
ables are measured and the data sources that were used. The technical 
specifications for the regressions and a more complete table of regression 
results also are shown.
Quantity demanded
The quantity of loans demanded (Q  d) is a function of the loan rate, 
local and national business conditions, and the future business outlook:     
  Qd = d(loan rate, business conditions, business outlook).  (1)
Local business conditions in each market are measured by 
the growth rate of local employment from the Quarterly  Census  of   
Employment and Wages (QCEW) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
National economic conditions are measured using the quarterly growth 
rate of real GDP from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The 
business outlook variable, measured at a national level, is created us-
ing survey information from the National Federation of Independent 
Business (NFIB). The business outlook variable is the percentage of re-
spondents that believe that the next three months will be a good time to 
expand. This measure should be associated with a higher probability of 
the business taking out a loan.
Quantity supplied
The quantity of loans supplied (Q s) by a bank is a function of the 
loan rate and characteristics of the bank’s production function for loans. 
Qs=s(loan rate, funding, capital, loan quality, liquidity, strategy, market 
characteristics) (2)
The bank-specific variables for the supply equation are calculated 
using data from Reports of Condition and Income (call reports). Capi-
tal is measured using the quarterly percentage change in Tier 1 capi-
tal. The funding mix is measured using the quarterly growth rate of 
core deposits, which include transaction accounts (including demand   48  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
deposits), money market deposit accounts, other savings deposits, and 
time deposits under $100,000.26 There are two measures for loan qual-
ity. The first is the ratio of problem assets divided by total loans and 
leases less unearned income on loans. Problem assets are defined as the 
sum of nonaccrual loans, loans and leases more than 90 days past due, 
and other real estate owned (OREO). The second variable is the ratio 
of loan loss provisions to total loans and leases less unearned income on 
loans. Liquidity is measured by the sum of available-for-sale securities 
and excess reserves to total assets. Bank lending strategies are measured 
using three binary variables that take on the value 1 if the bank is clas-
sified as a business lender, agricultural lender, or real-estate lender. A 
bank is classified, for example, as a business lender if commercial and 
industrial lending is its largest loan category. 
A number of control variables also are included. The level of com-
petition is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 
The HHI is calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of each 
bank in the market. Shares are based on deposits as reported in the 
Summary of Deposits data set, which is collected by the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation and the Office of Thrift Supervision.27 In 
addition, differences in metropolitan and rural markets are controlled 
for by using a binary variable equal to one for metropolitan markets. A 
variable for the interaction of the HHI and metropolitan binary vari-
ables also is included.
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis are pro-
vided in Table A1. It shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum 
value, and maximum value for each variable.
Instead of estimating equations (1) and (2) simultaneously, a re-
duced form approach is used to eliminate the endogenous loan rate and 
estimate the quantity of loans in a market as a function of the demand 
variables and supply variables.
Q = q (business conditions, business outlook, funding, capital, loan     
quality, liquidity, strategy, market characteristics)  (3)
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Variable Name      Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
    
Dependent variable
Commercial and industrial loan growth1  0.020  0.155 -0.407  0.742
      
Independent variables:
Demand:
Private employment growth1,2  0.004  0.119 -0.758  3.082
Real GDP growth  0.004  0.007  -0.017  0.017
NFIB survey question – “Good time to expand”  0.146  0.064  0.010  0.280
      
Supply:
Tier 1 capital growth1  0.013  0.037 -0.134  0.222
Core deposit growth1  0.007  0.049 -0.128  0.257
Loan loss provisions to total loans1  0.001  0.002 -0.001  0.016
Problem assets to total loans1  0.016  0.020 0.000 0.113
Excess reserves and securities to total assets1  0.254  0.157 0.017 0.667
      
Controls:
HHI2  0.209  0.149 0.038 1.000
Metro2  0.357  0.479 0.000 1.000
HHI*Metro2  0.033  0.050 0.000 0.474
Business bank strategy  0.022  0.147  0.000  1.000
Agricultural bank strategy  0.362  0.481  0.000  1.000
Real-estate bank strategy  0.600  0.490  0.000  1.000
Table A1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Note: All growth rates are quarterly.  Private employment growth and real GDP growth are seasonally adjusted.
1. Winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent level.
2. The descriptive statistics are calculated across banks, so the mean and standard deviation are affected by the num-
ber of banks in each period.
SBLS BL CapD e it ij
j
it jj it jj ,, ,, ,, =+ ++
=
−− ∑ αβ ββ 1
1
4

























β + ++ + −− −

































where SBL is small business lending; Cap is Tier 1 capital; Dep is core 
deposits; PA is problem assets; LLP is loan loss provisions; Liq is liquidi-
ty; Empl is local employment; GDP is real gross domestic product; Surv 
is the business outlook from the NFIB survey; HHI is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index; Metro is a binary variable that equals 1 if the bank 
is located in a metro area; Metro*HHI is the interaction between the 
Metro and HHI binary variables; BusBk is a binary variable that equals 50  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
1 if the bank is a business lender; AgBk is a binary variable that equals 1 
if the bank is an agricultural lender; ReBk is a binary variable that equals 
1 if the bank is a real-estate lender, and Seasj is a seasonal binary variable 
for the j th quarter of the year. j=2, 3, and 4.
The analysis focuses on two policy variables, bank capital (Cap) 
and problem assets (PA). Lagged values of certain variables are included 
because there may be delayed effects on lending. For example, even 
though capital increases today, it may take time to make a new loan. 
Thus, previous changes in capital may have an effect on lending today. 
Similarly, previous levels of problem assets may a have long-term im-
pact on management’s risk tolerance and subsequently affect lending 
decisions today. 
The data are an unbalanced panel data set, which includes an av-
erage of 1,265 banks per quarter over the 31 quarters.28 The analysis 
also controls for various econometric issues. Bank-fixed effects are used 
to capture differences among banks. To control for possible heteroske-
dasticity, standard errors are clustered at the bank level. To mitigate 
autocorrelation issues, four lags of the dependent variable are included. 
The regression includes seasonal binary variables to control for poten-
tial seasonal effects. To reduce the influence of extreme values, the fol-
lowing variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 1 percent levels: 
small business lending, employment, capital, core deposits, loan loss 
provisions, problem assets, and liquidity. In the same spirit, data are ex-
cluded for all de novo banks and any observation where a bank’s assets 
increased more than 10 percent in a quarter.29 This excludes mergers 
and acquisitions where the increase in small business loans is not the 
result of organic growth.
The results of the regressions are shown in Table A2. For conve-
nience, the table shows the sum of coefficients where there are lagged 
variables. The significance is based on an F-test of joint significance. 
Several other specifications were run to check the robustness of the 
results. Although these results are not shown here, the results were not 
substantially different across the various specifications. These included 
using quarterly time binary variables to control for factors that vary 
across time, different specifications of the employment variable, differ-
ent survey measures, and the Tier 1 capital ratio.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  51
 Variable Name  Regression Coefficients
Demand: 
Employment growth  0.029
Real GDP  0.599
NFIB survey question – “Good time to expand”  0.061
 
Supply: 
Tier 1 capital growth  0.135†
Core deposit growth  0.181***
Loan loss provisions to total loans  -7.261***
Problem assets to total loans  -0.483***
Excess reserves and securities to total assets  0.089***
 
Controls: 




Business bank strategy  0.073***
Agricultural bank strategy  -0.014
Real-estate bank strategy  -0.001







Notes:   For variables with lags, the table shows the sum of the lagged coefficients. For summed coefficients, signifi-
cance is measured using an F-test of joint significance. 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
† indicates statistical significance at the 11 percent level.
Panel vector autoregression (VAR)
The previous regressions measure the effect of individual variables 
while holding values of other variables constant. However, changes in 
the policy variables may cause changes in other supply and demand 
variables in the equation. To account for this endogeneity of the supply 
and demand variables, a panel VAR is estimated. 
The VAR consists of regression equations for small business lend-
ing growth and each of the demand and supply variables except for the 
national demand variables (GDP and the NFIB survey measure). The 
effects of these variables are captured using quarterly time dummies. 
Thus, the VAR is a seven-equation system with the national demand 
and control variables considered exogenous.30 
The Cholesky decomposition of the VAR error variance-covariance 
matrix creates a lower triangular contemporary coefficient matrix for 




3. Excess reserves and securities to total assets
4. Small business lending growth
5. Problem assets to total loans




biased if the endogenous variables are temporally exogenous with re-
spect to each other. Specifically, the estimates are not biased if the or-
dering of the endogenous variables is such that any given variable is 
contemporaneously exogenous with respect to each variable below it in 
the column vector of endogenous variables. 
The ordering of variables shown in Table A3 is based on the fol-
lowing reasoning. Economic conditions (in this case employment) are 
assumed to affect bank-specific variables immediately. Of course bank-
specific variables, such as loans, to a certain extent drive economic con-
ditions, but this effect is less immediate than the other way around. 
Thus, a change in employment would change workers’ income, which 
should cause an immediate change in deposits. As deposits change, cash 
and safe short-term securities would change at banks. The changes in 
employment, deposits, and cash at banks will influence lending. Even 
though lending does not necessarily have an immediate impact on 
problem assets (other than changing the denominator of our problem- 
asset ratio), lending is more responsive to employment, deposits, and 
cash than the problem-asset measure. 
The next three steps fall naturally in place. As problem assets 
change, loan loss provisions will also change and this change would be 
immediate. Further, loan loss provisions directly impact net income, 
and, thus, retained earnings which is a part of capital. Hence, loan loss 
provisions would immediately impact the capital base. ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  53
ENDNOTES
1The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, the “official” arbiter of recessions and expansions, determined that the re-
cent recession ran from December 2007 through June 2009. (See their press release 
at  http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html.) Although economic output started 
growing in June 2009, employment continued to fall through February 2010.
2Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2010) show that new firms are respon-
sible for new job creation. After adjusting for firm age, they find that small firms 
do not create more new jobs, on net, than large, established firms.
3Data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment 
and Wages and Business Employment Dynamics. Establishments are business loca-
tions, so these numbers also include smaller establishments or business locations 
of large businesses. Census Department data on employment by firm size are 
available only with a substantial lag. 
4See Robb and Robinson (2010) and Berger and Udell (1998).
5Data are from the Reports of Condition and Income. Commercial and 
industrial loans outstanding declined from almost $1.4 trillion to $1.1 trillion. 
Outstanding small loans to businesses declined from $286 billion to $262 billion. 
These loans have historically only been reported in June of each year. In 2010, 
banks were required to report this on a quarterly basis. 
6Smaller banks do not have the same ability as larger banks to access capi-
tal markets, which makes it harder for smaller banks to raise additional capital. 
Instead, smaller banks rely to a larger extent on retained earnings for capital ac-
cumulation, a factor that is very procyclical. 
7TARP was also used to provide capital to automobile manufacturers General 
Motors and Chrysler.
8When a borrower misses one or more payments, the loan is considered past 
due. Depending on the type of loan, banks will begin various efforts to collect the 
past due payments. Loans that are past due more than 90 days are listed as nonac-
crual loans. The bank stops accruing interest due on the nonaccrual loans, and any 
payments received are applied first to past due principal. Property acquired through 
foreclosure is known as Other Real Estate Owned (OREO). The bank will try to sell 
its OREO to recover principal and interest owed on the foreclosed loan.
Traditionally, loans have made up the bulk of problem assets. However, in the 
recent recession, bank-owned securities, such as “private-labeled” or non-Agency, 
mortgage-backed securities and securitized trust preferred securities, became im-
paired due to credit problems with the collateral underlying these securities. Se-
curities impaired due to credit problems are known as “other than temporary 
impairments” (OTTI) and must be written down as a loss against income. Prob-
lems in the securities portfolio are not included in our measure of problem assets. 54  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
9The press release describing the program can be found at http://www.fdic.gov/
news/news/press/2009/pr09121.html
10Including measures for nationwide economic conditions captures loan de-
mand from small businesses that sell over a broader area.
11The Tenth District includes Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Wyo-
ming, western Missouri and northern New Mexico.
12Local market deposits are calculated from the FDIC’s June 2009   
Survey of Deposits.
13For example, federal banking regulations limit the maximum aggregate loan 
amount to any one borrower to 15 percent of a bank’s capital for national banks 
(similar limits apply to state charted banks in most states). For a national bank with 
$1 billion in assets and a 10 percent capital-to-asset ratio, the maximum loan size 
would be $15 million.
14Due to their small size, these banks accounted for only 51 percent of Tenth 
District banking assets as of December 31, 2010.
15This definition of local markets is the standard approach followed in most 
banking studies. See for example Berger, Rosen, and Udell (2007).
16In a study by Prager and Wolken (2008), 66 percent of the small businesses 
in their sample obtained credit only from banks with assets more than $1 billion. 
In addition, Montoriol-Garriga and Wang (2010) note that banks with more than 
$50 billion in assets now account for more than 50 percent of small business loans. 
17The February 2010 National Federation of Independent Businesses survey 
on small business credit found that small business owners rely to a large extent on 
both their homes and their business real estate for equity. Seventeen percent of 
small business owners with a mortgage obtained the mortgage to help finance their 
business, and 16 percent of business owners with a mortgage on their firm’s real es-
tate took out the mortgage to finance other business activities. Also see Schweitzer 
and Shane (2010). 
18Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Berrospide and Edge (2010) both exam-
ine the effects of capital on bank lending using the growth rate of lending as the 
dependent variable. The growth in loans is used to measure new loans. It actually 
measures the net change in loans, which may differ from actual new loans. For 
example, “new” loans would be higher than “net” loans if some existing loans are 
not renewed.
19Tier 1 capital is significant only at the 11 percent level, but other specifica-
tions find it significant at a lower level. The finding that the demand variables are 
not statistically significant could mean that demand factors were not appropriately 
accounted for in the regression equation, which means the estimated coefficients 
on the supply factors could be biased. However, the bias would not alter the general 
conclusion of the article that the impact on small business lending of changes in 
the two policy variables of interest—capital and problem assets—are not very large. 
Because capital and problem assets tend to be procyclical, i.e., as economic activ-ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  55
ity and aggregate demand expand, capital tends to increase and problem assets 
tend to decrease, the omission of demand effects would cause the coefficients on 
capital and problem assets to be larger than their true values. Thus, if anything, 
the impact of changes in capital and problem assets are even smaller than reported 
in the article.  
20The long-run effect of a shock to the specific variable is  
∑− ∑ == jj kj j 1
4
1
4 1 β γ
, ()  where βk,j is the coefficient of variable k at lag j 
and γj is the coefficient of the jth-lag of the dependent variable. See Table A2 in 
the appendix for actual point estimates of all variables in the regression equation.
21The four-quarter-ahead prediction of the cumulative change in lending is 
based on a one-time change in capital growth, which impacts lending beyond 
the next quarter because the regression includes four lags of lending growth and 
of  other explanatory variables (see equation 3 in the Appendix). The regression 
results in Table A2 in the Appendix show the sum of the lagged coefficients on 
lending growth and each of the lagged explanatory variables. The calculation of 
the four-quarter-ahead prediction of the change in lending requires the individual 
coefficients on each lag of lending growth and the explanatory variables, which are 
available from the authors upon request.
22Total loans are assumed to stay constant.
23The variables that are believed to have feedback effects are often called 
endogenous variables, or variables that are determined within the model. The 
endogenous variables in the VAR are the growth in employment, deposits, small 
business lending, and capital, and the ratios of excess reserves and securities to 
total assets, problem assets to total loans, and loan loss provisions to total loans.
24The VAR results are used to calculate impulse response functions, shown 
in Chart 2, that show how lending changes in response to changes in capital and 
problem assets, while also allowing other variables to adjust to these changes. The 
VAR analysis and impulse response functions are described in the Appendix.
25As noted in previous discussion in the text, this assumes the capital program 
does not provide special incentives to use the capital for small business lending 
relative to other types of lending or debt reduction. 
26Deposits over the limit for insured deposits are considered to be less stable. 
For most of the period included in the analysis, deposit insurance coverage was 
limited to $100,000. Although the coverage was raised in 2008 to $250,000 for 
time deposits, bank call reports continued to collect data by size of deposits using 
a $100,000 break point.
27The Summary of Deposits data are deposit balances for each bank branch 
in the country. Branches of a bank are aggregated within each market to measure 
the bank’s market share.
28Some banks were not present in all quarters. The data include a total 
of 1,214 different banks. Banks were in the study an average of 26 of the 31   56  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
quarters. Only 31 quarters of the data are available because five quarters are used 
to calculate the lagged annual growth rates and lagged four-quarter average values.
29This is a standard approach. See for example Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, 
and Tehranian (2010). Also, banks were excluded if they did not have any loans 
or if they did not have any business, real estate, agricultural or consumer loans.
30Standard statistical tests found the endogenous variables were stationary.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  57
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